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The evolving right to counsel on
state post-conviction review

F

ifty years after Gideon
v. Wainwright announced that lawyers at
state criminal trials are
constitutional necessities and not luxuries, the metes
and bounds of the right to counsel
are still being hashed out in the
courts.
In particular, the law is evolving
on the right to counsel during
state post-conviction review, with
the U.S. Supreme Court recently
acknowledging, in Martinez v.
Ryan, that sometimes lawyers are
necessary (albeit not constitutionally compelled) during state collateral proceedings. 132 S.Ct. 1309,
1320 (2012).
But the importance of Martinez
has not yet been recognized by
either the Illinois courts or its
legislature. Of particular concern
is a decision this summer from
the Illinois Appellate Court, which
refused to excuse a procedural default where the petitioner — who
had been convicted of murder —
failed to raise an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” claim in
his initial post-conviction proceeding.
The petitioner argued that the
cause of his procedural default
was the state’s failure to provide
him a lawyer to help with his first
post-conviction application. The
court should, he urged, therefore
listen to his ineffective assistance
claim now, in a second post-conviction proceeding. People v.
Sutherland, 2013 IL App (1st)
113072, ¶ 1 (2013).
The appellate court didn’t buy
the argument, refusing to excuse
the default or hear the merits of
the underlying ineffective assistance claim.
To be sure, Sutherland is consistent with the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act and state decisional law on procedural defaults. Under the act, a petitioner
gets one chance to raise his
claims in post-conviction proceedings, implicitly waiving any claim
that he fails to raise in his first goround. If he wants to raise a new
claim in a second petition, he
must show “cause” for failing to
raise it the first time — that is,

“an objective factor that impeded
his … ability to raise a specific
claim.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f).
Because a petitioner isn’t entitled to a lawyer on post-conviction review in Illinois, he simply
can’t argue that the lack of a
lawyer was sufficient cause to excuse a default.
That’s all well and good, but the
Sutherland holding is in deep tension with emerging U.S. Supreme
Court case law emphasizing the
importance of providing lawyers
to petitioners to help them raise
“ineffective assistance” claims in
post-conviction proceedings.
In Martinez v. Ryan, the court
dealt with a federal habeas petitioner who had procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance
claim by failing to raise it in his
first state post-conviction proceeding. Because the state required that ineffective assistance
of counsel be raised on collateral
review instead of direct review
(where there’s an undisputed right
to counsel), the failure of the state
to provide a lawyer was sufficient
“cause” to excuse the procedural
default. 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
The court accordingly authorized the federal habeas court to
reach the merits of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim de
novo.
Then, last term, the court extended the rule of Martinez to situations where the state doesn’t
absolutely require that ineffective
assistance claims be raised in collateral proceedings (where a petitioner has no right to a lawyer at
state expense), at least when “as a
matter of procedural design and
systemic operation” such claims
can only realistically be raised on
post-conviction review. Trevino v.
Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013).
Illinois’ procedures arguably fall
within the category described in
Trevino.
To be clear, neither Martinez
nor Trevino modified long-standing precedent that there is no
constitutional right to counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings.
And the court explicitly noted
that because its new rule was “equitable” in nature, states like Illi-
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nois remain free not to provide
counsel to state collateral petitioners who wish to raise ineffective
assistance claims. Martinez, 132
S.Ct. at 1319–20.
But the continued refusal of Illinois to supply counsel to postconviction petitioners is nonetheless unwise and should be reconsidered by both the Illinois
Supreme Court and the General
Assembly. First, Illinois should respect the sound judgment of the
U.S. Supreme Court that there’s
something profoundly unfair
about forcing defendants with
claims of constitutional trial error
— as routinely happens in Illinois
— to litigate pro se.
Second, even though the state

‘‘

Illinois
should
respect the sound
judgment of the U.S.
Supreme Court that
there’s something
profoundly unfair
about forcing
defendants with
claims of constitutional trial error —
as routinely happens
in Illinois — to
litigate pro se.”

has no constitutional obligation to
provide a lawyer to post-conviction petitioners, after Martinez
and Trevino the failure to do so
assures that those petitioners will
have their ineffective-assistance
claims decided on the merits by a
federal habeas judge. And that decision will be made with no deference to any state rulings because the claims will have been
defaulted rather than decided on
the merits in state court.
In contrast, if Illinois were to
provide counsel to the post-conviction petitioner, as is done in
nearly half the other states, any
procedurally defaulted claim
would not even be entertained by
the federal courts.
It’s unclear to me why the Illinois courts would want to surrender their right and responsibility to adjudicate these claims.
And yet, that’s exactly the result
the Sutherland holding will achieve
if the Illinois Supreme Court allows it to stand — or if the PostConviction Hearing Act is not
amended by the legislature.
As it happens, earlier this year
the Illinois Supreme Court already called on the General Assembly to revisit the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In People v.
Evans, the court pointed to a host
of “important deficiencies” in the
act’s treatment of “successive petitions,” including the failure of
the legislature to prescribe evidentiary and pleading requirements that would guide the courts
in determining when “cause” was
adequate to excuse procedural defaults. 2103 IL 113471, ¶ 18 (2013).
The General Assembly should
heed the court’s request. And
while they’re at it, they should
consider establishing at least a
limited right to counsel on postconviction review, to conform with
U.S. Supreme Court guidance and
assure that our courts retain all
the prerogatives of state
sovereignty.
In the meantime, the Illinois
Supreme Court should itself consider whether Sutherland accurately captures the state of Illinois
law in the wake of Martinez and
Trevino.
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